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No TAKE BAcKs: 
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY AND PUBLIC LAND WITHDRAWALS 
By Christian Termyn* 
I. I 'TROD CTIO. 
I
n the twilight of his presidency, Barack Obama made sev-
eral announcements withdrawing federal land from devel-
opment. These executive actions were protective measures 
taken under longstanding authorities of the Antiquities Act of 
1906 1 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act2 (OCSLA), 
which delegate a portion of Congress' primary Constitutional 
authority over federal lands to the executive branch. Specifically, 
the statutes authorize the President to unilaterally withdraw cer-
tain land from development, which can be an extremely contro-
versial measure depending on the location and size of the parcel 
to be protected, the productive uses restricted , and the heated 
politics of federal land management more generally. President 
Obama's last-minute land withdrawals were no exception. 
A lingering question is whether the President, by the same 
authority, may revoke these protective measures and effectively 
reopen withdrawn lands to disposition. This question implicates 
the Constitution, statutes authorizing executive land withdraw-
als, and other sources of positive law, but is also susceptible to 
strong intuitions and normative judgments about the role of the 
Executive in land use policy. The Antiquities Act and OCSLA 
are silent as to revocability, even as similar statutes authorizing 
the President to withdraw lands expressly provide for reversal 
of those withdrawals. As no president until now has revoked a 
prior land withdrawal under these statues, the courts have not 
had the opportunity to weigh in. 
President Trump converted these hypotheticals into reality. 
In April 2017, he issued an executive order calling for a review 
of national monument designations under the Antiquities Act, 
signaling an intention to return lands protected under the Act to 
the public domain.3 Two days later, a second order reversed the 
Obama Administration 's ban on Arctic drilling pursuant to the 
OCSLA.4 Environmental groups have challenged both orders 
and, for the first time, a federal court was presented with the 
question whether the Executive may reverse a predecessor 's 
land witbdrawal.5 
This paper concludes that the President currently lacks 
authority to reverse a land withdrawal under the Antiquities 
Act or OCSLA. It begins by reviewing executive withdrawal 
authorities under the two statutes, as well as President Trump's 
recent executive orders.6 Part IIJ then discusses the nature of 
executive action in the public lands context, taking care to dis-
tinguish it from the President's free exercise of Article Il pow-
ers , including reversal of a predecessor 's executive actions. 7 
The President has no inherent authority in the land use context, 
and reversing a prior land withdrawal constitutes a unique pol-
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icy decision requiring delegation of authority from Congress.s 
Part IV returns to the statutes themselves, concluding that the 
Antiquities Act and OCSLA cannot be read to delegate such 
authority.9 Congress has repudiated implied executive authority 
in the public lands context and has demonstrated that it knows 
how to delegate revocation authority when necessary to fulfill 
its policy objectives.10 Part V discusses the potential implica-
tions of executive reversal of land withdrawals on use of the 
Antiquities Act and OCSLA as tools to address environmental 
policy objectives.11 Part VI then briefly concludes.12 
II. EXECUTIVE WITHDRAWAL AUTHORITY 
UNDER T HE ANTIQ ITIES AND OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACTS 
The Constitution vests Congress with broad powers over 
the public lands. 13 One of the major legal mechanisms govern-
ing the status of public lands is a land "withdrawal." Histori-
cally, withdrawal of federal land refers to the process by which 
the public domain is withdrawn or reserved for certain specific 
purposes and thereby segregated from the operation of various 
other public land laws authorizing the use or disposition of the 
lands.14 Withdrawals of public lands were initiated beginning in 
the earliest days of the Republic to establish military and Indian 
reservations, lighthouses, townsites, and , eventually, railroads. 15 
Today, withdrawals are more commonly a protective measure 
to preserve the status quo and prevent specific future uses in 
designated areas.16 
ln general , withdrawals of public lands are accomplished 
by one of three means: ( l) express withdrawals of specified 
lands for a particular purpose by act of Congress; (2) withdraw-
als by the Executive pursuant to statutory delegation, which can 
either authorize withdrawal for a particular purpose while leav-
ing the selection and withdrawal of the qualifying lands to the 
Executive, or generally authorize the Executive to withdraw for 
public purposes; and (3) withdrawals by the Executive without 
statutory authority, for instance, where implied ly authorized 
by Congress' longstanding acquiescence to an executive with-
drawal practice.17 A comprehensive 1969 study of withdrawals 
and reservations of public domain lands marveled that " [o]ver 
four hundred statutes, thousands of Executive orders, numerous 
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adm ini strati ve regulations and administrative and j udicia l adju -
dications" govern the withdrawal process .18 
The evol ution of federa l public lands poli cy, and the com-
plex in terrelationship between Congress and the Executi ve 
in setting and carrying out that po li cy, is a ri ch history we ll 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, two strands of the his-
tory are necessary as background. F irst, while the Antiquiti es 
Act and OCSLA have been appli ed expansive ly to withd raw 
land from development, executive withd rawa l authority has 
narrowed overall . Pres idents have exerc ised broad implied 
authority to withd raw lands th ro ughout the nineteenth and 
into the early twentieth century. More recently, Congress ha 
express ly repudiated any imp I ied w ithdrawa l authority and nar-
rowed express statutory authoriti es. 19 This trend advises aga inst 
imply ing an executive authori ty to return withd rawn lands to 
the public domain where a statute is s il ent. 
The second hi stori ca l note pertains to the shi fting poli cy 
of retention, management and di sposition of pub I ic lands, and 
an evolving conception of the publi c interest there in . Though 
public lands legis lati on was hi sto ri call y concerned with prov id-
ing fo r the disposa l of the public domain , a growing recogni-
tion of the shortcomings of di sposal po li cy led the government 
to retain many tracts of land in federa l ownership .20 The 
Executi ve had hi stori ca ll y w ithdrawn land fo r limited public 
uses, such as milita ry or lndian reservations.21 As conserva-
tion became a critica l national concern in the late nineteenth 
centu ry, 22 the Executi ve was to play a key ro le, and fo r good 
reason. Equipped w ith land withdrawa l authori ty, the Pres ident 
could act decisive ly to identi fy and protect certa in parce ls while 
Congress remained free to undo or modify the action.23 
The Antiquities Act and OCSLA are just two statutes in an 
expansive body of law governing executi ve withdrawa l author-
ity. Enacted fi fty years apart and fo r very di fferent purposes, 
they are not obvious partners fo r a lega l analysis. They share 
a structu ra l similari ty in granting the Pres iden t a unil atera l 
authori ty to withdraw land from the public domain w ithout 
sayi ng anything about a corresponding authority to reverse 
the withdrawal. And under the Obama Ad ministrat ion, they 
became primary too ls to protect federal land and were wielded 
wi th express reference to controversia l environmenta l poli cy 
objectives including climate change mi tigation. These appar-
ent "one-way" authoriti es, applied to simil ar purposes, set the 
Anti quities Act and OCSLA apart fro m other federa l laws and 
prov ide a un ique lens in to executive public lands authori ty. 24 
A . TH E A NTLQU ITIES A CT OF 1906 
The Antiquities Act of 1906 is "one of the earli est statu tes 
vesting the Executive with discretion to make withdrawa ls."25 
Although the statute is onl y two sentences long, its impact on 
federa l lands cannot be overstated. S ince its passage, seventeen 
of twenty-one Pres idents have used the Act to proc la im 158 
national monuments, withdrawing hundreds of mi II ions of acres 
from the publi c domain .26 President Franklin D. Roosevelt used 
hi authori ty thi rty-six times, more than any other Pres ident, 
while Pres ident Obama withdrew the most acreage, over 550 
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million ac res.27 Numerous withdrawa ls were accompli shed by 
lame duck Presidents, fue ling the po li tica l fire around des ig-
nations despi te the fact that use of the Act has been di st inctly 
bipartisan, with some of the most vigorous uses of the Act com-
ing from Repub licans. 28 
T he Act authorizes the President to "dec lare by pub I ic 
proc lamat ion hi stori c landmarks, hi stori c and prehi sto ri c 
structures , and o ther obj ects of hi storic or scientific interest . 
. . to be nationa l mon uments."29 As part of a nationa l mon u-
ment, the Pres ident may reserve parce ls of land fro m the publi c 
doma in whi ch "sha ll be confi ned to the smallest a rea compat-
ib le with the proper care and management of the o bj ects to 
be protected."3° Conspicuously missing fro m the statute is 
any spec ificat ion of procedure to create a nationa l monument, 
beyond that the Pres ident shall "proclai m" one.31 T he Act 
is a lso s il ent as to whether a Pres ident may aboli sh a monu-
ment estab li shed by a prev ious pres identia l proc lam ation. No 
President has abo li shed a nationa l monument, and no court has 
add ressed whether the Pres ident has the authori ty to do so. 
Much criti c ism of the Act cente rs on whether the Pres ident 
exceeds the statu tory authori ty by p roc la im ing monuments of 
certain substance and acreage. [ts scope was challenged soon 
after the Act's passage, but the United States Supreme Court 
gave a w ide construction to the authori ty and has never over-
turned the des ignation of a monument. 32 However, despi te 
longstanding precedent and Congress ional acquiescence to 
executi ve nationa l monument practice, some scho lars still argue 
that certa in monument proc lamations are un lawful. 33 These 
arguments re ly on a narrow reading of the origina l purpose of 
the Act as so lely des igned to protect objects of antiqui ty, rather 
than fo r impenni ss ibly broad purposes such as "genera l con-
servation, recreation, scenic protection, or p rotection o f li ving 
organisms. "34 Critics a lso a rgue that the des ignation of la rge 
monuments vio lates the Act's open-ended ac reage limi tat ion.35 
lt is contended that the Act is an unconstituti ona ll y broad del-
egation of Congress ' power under the Property Clause. 36 
T he pres identi a l proclamation c reating a nationa l monu-
ment under the Act is a lso rare ly the las t word as to that monu-
ment's size and lega l characteri sti cs. Both Congress and the 
Pres ident have modified monuments established by earli er 
pres identia l proc lamation- the Trump Administrat ion is o nly 
the latest example .37 Modifica tions include reducti ons in scope 
but a lso, commonl y, Congress has enhanced protective des igna-
tions fo r monuments. For instance, approx imate ly ha lf of our 
national parks were first des ignated as national monuments, 
inc luding the Grand Canyon, Grand Teton, Z ion, and Olym-
pic .38 Jn at least ten instances, Congress has outright abo li shed 
monuments created by the Pres ident. 39 T he executi ve branch, 
however, has never outri ght abo li shed a monument. 
The c lai m that many monument designati ons are " ille-
ga l"- e ithe r too la rge, inconsistent w ith the purpose of the Act, 
or otherwise- was the dri ving fo rce behind ca ll s fo r Pres ident 
Trump to rescind prev ious mo nument des ignations . Trump 's 
Executi ve Order 13 792 directed the Secretary of the Interior 
to review a ll monument des ignations or expansions under the 
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Antiquities Act since I 996 where the monument covers more 
than l 00,000 acres, or "where the Secretary determines that the 
designation or expansion was made without adequate public 
outreach and coordination with relevant stakeholders."40 The 
Secretary 's charge was to consider each monument's compat-
ibility with the Antiquities Act and the effects of the withdrawal 
on various uses of that federal land and surrounding communi-
ties, among other considerations.41 
ln response, the Department oflnterior initiated the first-
ever formal public comment period on monument designations 
under the Antiquities Act.42 After receiving nearly three million 
public comments and issuing an interim report specific to the 
Bears Ears National Monument, Secretary of the Interior Ryan 
Zinke released a final report recommending modifications to 
ten monuments.43 The Secretary's conclusions are aptly sum-
marized as follows: 
(1) Monuments designated under the Antiquities 
Act were broadly and arbitrarily defined and in some 
instances mirrored broader land management legisla-
tion that had stalled circumventing the legislative 
process; (2) designating geographic landscape areas 
as objects of historic or scientific interest raises man-
agement questions that may be more appropriately 
regulated under FLPMA; (3) there is perception that 
monument designation was intended to prevent access 
and economic activity, including grazing, mining, 
and timber production as opposed to protect specific 
objects, and such designations may limit use ofprivate 
land ; ( 4) concerns have been raised by state, tribal , 
and local governments regarding lost jobs, access, and 
inadequate public involvement; and (5) large designa-
tions under the Act may provide less protection than 
applicable land-management authorities already in 
place and therefore undermine the intent of the Act.44 
President Trump wasted no time diminishing the Bears 
Ears ational Monument45 and the Grand Staircase-Escalante 
National Monument,46 issuing separate proclamations concur-
rent with the report's release. A broad coalition of federally 
recognized tribes, environmental groups, and others immedi-
ately filed suit alleging that President Trump 's proclamations 
exceed presidential authority under the U.S. Constitution and 
Antiquities Act and that only Congress may diminish a national 
monument.47 
President Trump's proclamations reduced in size, rather 
than outright abolished, the two monuments .48 The Admin-
istration , however, is continuing to review other monument 
designations; its rhetoric around righting the perceived wrongs 
of prior administrations' land management decisions suggests 
further reductions or reversals could be in store.49 This paper 
is not meant to parse the legality of monuments under review 
and does not wade into the nuanced legal arguments regard-
ing reductions to Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalation. 
Instead, it uses the hypothetical revocation of a national monu-
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ment to explore the limits of presidential authority over federal 
land management decisions. 
As I will explain, the exercise of presidential land manage-
ment authority cannot rest on the perceived overreach ofa pre-
decessor. A successor may have political and legal gripes with a 
prior administration's withdrawals, but there is no on/off switch 
for these decisions, at least not under present authorities. 
B. TH E O uTER Co TINE TAL SHELF LANDS AcT 
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, passed on August 
7, I 953 , provides for federal jurisdiction over submerged lands 
of the outer continental shelf (OCS), a huge area defined as all 
submerged lands seaward of state coastal waters (three miles 
offshore) under U.S. jurisdiction.so OCSLA authorizes the Sec-
retary of the Interior to lease tho e lands for mineral develop-
ment.SI It also grants the President broad authority to withdraw 
portions of the OCS from mineral leasing.s2 
The OCSLA withdrawal authority is limited to a particu-
lar federal action- mineral leasing- but affords the president 
more discretion than the Antiquities Act. s3 Section 12(a) allows 
the President to bar the disposition of title or rights to land or 
minerals under federal marine waters. s4 The president is not 
restricted to withdrawing "objects of historic or scientific inter-
est" or the "smallest [land parcel] compatible with the proper 
care and management of the objects to be protected," as she is 
when proclaiming national monuments under the Antiquities 
Act. 55 lnstead, the President can withdraw any sized area of 
OCS for any public purpose, making Section I 2(a) a powerful 
tool for satisfying broader policy goals.s6 
Since 1953, six presidents have employed Section l 2(a), 
withdrawing as much as several hundred million acres at a 
time.s7 Like the Antiquities Act, OCSLA is silent as to undoing 
actions taken under the withdrawal authority. ss Interestingly, 
not all presidential withdrawals are permanent; some have been 
expressly time limited despite no textual distinction in Sec-
tion 12(a) between a permanent or time-limited withdrawa1.s9 
While no president before Trump had reversed a permanent 
withdrawal under OCSLA, there have been several instances 
of modification and revocation of time-limited withdrawals.60 
Until the Trump Administration, neither permanent nor time-
limited Presidential withdrawals under OCSLA had been tested 
by the courts.61 
On April 28, 2017, President Trump issued an executive 
order (EO) titled "Implementing an America-First Offshore 
Energy Strategy."62 Among other steps to enhance offshore 
energy development, the order revoked or modified four of 
President Obama's executive actions withdrawing portions of 
the outer continental shelf from mineral leasing.63 President 
Obama had declared a policy of enhancing the resilience of the 
northern Bering Sea region and withdrawn from leas ing the 
orton Basin and St. Matthew-Hall Planning Areas.64 President 
Trump revoked this order citing a need to " further streamline 
existing regulatory authorities."6s 
The Trump Order also effectively reversed three other 
expansive withdrawals of the outer continental shelf that Presi-
Sustainable Development Law & Policy 
dent Obama accomplished through pres identi a l memoranda.66 
Rather than ex plicitly revoke the Obama memoranda, the 
Trump Order merely replaced the language of the memoranda 
with a withdrawa l prov ision I imited just to "those areas of the 
Outer Continental Shelf des ignated as of July 14, 2008, as 
Marine Sanctuaries under the Marine Protection, Research , and 
Sanctuari es Act of 1972 . . . . "67 Environmental organizations 
quickly fil ed suit making similar arguments to the challengers 
in the monument litigation: by exceeding Congress ' delegation 
of authori ty to withdraw unleased lands under the OCS LA, 
Pres ident Trump violated the pla in text of the statute and the 
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 68 In March 
20 19, the Distri ct Court of Alaska found that the Congress had 
not delegated to the president the authority to revoke a with-
drawa l under the OCSLA .69 The court vacated the portions of 
the Trump Order revoking Pres ident Obama 's prior withdraw-
als, holding that the withdrawa ls would remain " in full force 
and effect unless and until revoked by Congress ."70 
Ill. THE EXECUTl\'E AUTHORITY TO 
WITHDRAW DOES NOT I CLUDE THE 
POWER TO REVOKE A WITHDRAWAL 
As di scussed above, President Trump has full y reversed 
severa l withdrawals under the OCSLA and signaled a des ire to 
revoke monument des ignations under the Antiquities Act. His 
supporters argue that these actions are indistinguishable from 
modern Pres idents' frequent modifi cation and revocation of 
a predecessor 's executive actions. This section explores what 
exactl y the President accompli shes when she withdraws land 
from the public domain , in order to di stinguish executive land 
withdrawals from executi ve actions taken pursuant to Article 
II powers. Since the President has no inherent constitutional 
authori ty to withdraw public lands, executi ve action under the 
Antiquities Act or OCSLA is confined to the underlying statu-
tory authority. Reversing these actions is less cons istent with 
fa miliar executive branch function s, and more accurately under-
stood as a separate land action requiring express or implied 
delegation from Congress. 
A. 0ISTfNGUISHI G TH E U SE OF EXECUTI VE ORDERS, 
P RESIDENT IAL P ROCLAMATIO S, A D P RESIDENTI AL 
M EMORAN DA I TH E P UBLIC L AN DS C ONTEXT 
Presidents utilize various written instruments to direct the 
Executi ve bra nch and implement policy. These include execu-
tive orders, proclamations , pres identi al memoranda, adminis-
trative directives, findings, and others. Most of the time, the 
Pres ident is free to choose the instrument she wishes to use to 
carry out the executi ve function. 71 While the Antiquities Act 
provides that the Pres ident may "dec lare by public proclama-
tion" a national monument, neither that Act nor OCSLA spec i-
fi es a parti cul ar fo rm or procedure fo r the land withdrawa l. 72 
To ca rry out land actions, Pres idents have used executi ve 
orders, pres idential memora nda, and pres idential proclama-
tions, sometimes interchangeably, 73 though any difference 
between these devices may be a matter of form rather than 
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substance. As the Consti tution contains no reference to execu-
ti ve orders, judges and scholars have been left to develop a 
lega l and descripti ve basis fo r the instruments fro m hi stori ca l 
practice. 74 Though hi stori ca l practi ce might suggest proclama-
tions are more geared towards pri vate indi viduals, while orders 
are more towards admini stration of government, 75 more recent 
accounts suggest that the instruments defy these di stinctions 
too often fo r any differences to be legall y s ignifi cant. 76 Federa l 
courts a lso tend to ho ld executive orders and proc lamations to 
be "equi va lent fo r the purposes of ca rry ing out the Pres ident's 
lega l authority."77 
Just as the Constituti on conta ins no definition of these 
instruments, it does not c learl y authori ze the ir issuance. The 
common thread, then, is that the execution and implementa-
ti on of executi ve actions must stem from some express or 
implied lega l authority.78 The Pres ident, for instance, has issued 
a Thanksgiving Proclamation annually s ince 1863. 79 Though 
nobody is challeng ing the lega l bas is for thi s Proclamation, 
it like ly emanates from Article Il 's vesting clause.80 The bulk 
of executi ve action taken by the White House, as o pposed to 
administrati ve agenci es, emanates from Article 11 power. This 
would include declaring that it is the "po licy of the United 
States to encourage energy exploration and productio n," 81 or 
directing the Secretary of the Interior to perform a legal analy-
sis of monument designations. 
These actions, while referencing our public lands, are not 
acting upon them with legal force and effect. Arguments that 
the Artic le 11 executi ve fun ction inc ludes some inherent author-
ity over public land have been rej ected.82 Executi ve orders, 
proclamations and memoranda to withdraw lands, then, must 
deri ve from express or impli ed statutory authori ty. A "one-way" 
delegation of authority- to withdraw land from, but not to 
return it to the public doma in- is consi stent with the Constitu-
tional separation of powers. 
B. A O NE-WAY E X ECUTI VE A UTHORITY TO WITHDRAW 
L AN DS IS P ERMI SS IBLE 
In practice, Presidents freely revoke, modify and supersede 
their own orders or those issued by a predecessor. Executi ve 
actions, by their very nature, lack stability in the face of evolv-
ing pres idential priorities.83 It is a ritual of modern go vernment 
that incoming Pres idents re instate or rescind Pres ident Reagan 's 
1984 executi ve order blocking fo reign aid to organi zations 
providing abortions. 84 Beginning with Gerald Ford 's admini s-
tration, pres idents have acti vely issued, modified and revoked 
orders to assert control over and influence the agency rulemak-
ing process. 85 That Thanksgiving Proclamati on?86 It 's on thin 
ice each ovember. 
Several commentators have argued that the executi ve 
power includes the authority to revoke executi ve actions taken 
under the Antiquities Act and OCSLA authoriti es. John Yoo 
and Todd Ganziano advocate a "general principle . .. that the 
authori ty to execute a di scretionary government power usu-
a lly includes the power to revoke it- unless the orig inal grant 
expressly limits the power of revocation."87 In their view, it is 
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rooted in the Constitution that "a branch of government can 
reverse its earlier actions using the same process originally 
used,"88 and that "[n]o president can bind future presidents in 
the use of their constitutional authorities."89 This leads them 
to suggest that "[i]t would be quite an anomaly to identify an 
executive directive or presidential proclamation that a subse-
quent president could not revoke."90 
These principles might operate on the Article II executive 
function, but they cannot extend to executive land withdrawal 
authority, which has no roots in the Constitution. A Ninth Cir-
cuit case challenges the broad claim that a discretionary power 
to act includes a power to revoke.91 The U .S. Attorney General 
had moved to denaturalize several recently naturalized U.S. 
citizens, arguing that the power to denaturalize is " inherent" 
to the power to naturalize, which the Attorney General derives 
from statute.92 The court examined the statute, silent as to the 
matter of revocation of citizenship, and made a compelling 
analogy to the power of U.S District Courts to vacate their 
own judgments.93 This seemingly "traditional inherent power" 
of federal courts to vacate their own judgments was nonethe-
less confirmed by Congress with an express rule. 94 The Ninth 
Circuit reasons that "[i]f [this power] needs confirmation by an 
express rule approved by Congress, it is too much to infer an 
analogous power in the Attorney General, for so weighty a mat-
ter as revocation of American citizenship, from silence."95 
Where authority to act in the first place requires an express 
rule, as in executive action impacting public lands, a reviewing 
court should look for clear intent regarding the matter of revo-
cation. The concept that what "one can do, one can undo," may 
be an intuitive one, but as the Ninth Circuit suggests, it is easily 
rebutted and should not control where the underlying authority 
is delegated to begin with: 
The formula the government urges, that what one can 
do, one can undo, is sometimes true, sometimes not. 
A person can give a gift, but cannot take it back. A 
minister, priest, or rabbi can marry people, but can-
not grant divorces and annulments for civil purposes. 
A jury can acquit, but cannot revoke its acquittal and 
convict. Whether the Attorney General can undo what 
she has the power to do, naturalize citizens, depends on 
whether Congress said she could.96 
We should be careful not to conflate Constitutional with 
statutorily delegated authority in the public lands context, as 
Yoo and Ganziano do.97 A court examining President Trump's 
reversal of land withdrawals, then, should not be persuaded 
by instances where the President is permitted to undo certain 
Constitutional powers without Congressional authority.98 Our 
approach to unilateral revocation under the President's appoint-
ment or treaty powers do not support some inherent executive 
authority to undo actions vested in another branch, such as 
Congress' plenary authority over public lands. Whether the 
President may reverse a predecessor 's land withdrawal , there-
fore, "depends on whether Congress said she could."99 
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C. REVOCATION OF A L A D WITHDRAWAL IS A SEPARATE 
L EGIS LATIVE ACT 
The sense that what "one can do, one can undo" may 
be a powerful one, but has no place in the public lands con-
text, where the President is confined to specific delegations 
of authority. Executive action to undo a predecessor 's land 
withdrawal requires express or implied authority. This section 
reaches a similar conclusion from a different angle, arguing 
that the act of returning withdrawn land to the public domain 
is not simply the inverse of withdrawing land in the first place. 
Rather, it has the characteristics of a separate legislative act, 
which requires a delegation of authority and an intelligible prin-
ciple to guide the exercise of that authority. 
Yoo and Ganziano argue that when Congress grants di scre-
tionary authority to issue regulations, Congress also confers the 
authority to substantially amend or repeal them.100 They also 
suggest that reading the Antiquities Act to prevent Presidents 
from reversing earlier monument designations would read the 
Act to " micromanage" the discretion granted, "rais[ing] serious 
constitutional questions." 101 It would be laughable, on any read-
ing, to suggest that the Antiquities Act micromanages Executive 
land withdrawal authority; indeed, the main criticism of the 
Act is that the authority delegated is too expansive. A power to 
revoke previous designations implicates entirely separate legis-
lative goals, distinct policy questions, and would conflict with 
existing statutes. 
A court should approach revocation of a withdrawal under 
the Antiquities Act or OCSLA as a decision with legislative 
character separate from the original withdrawal. In both stat-
utes, Congress includes language to guide the President in 
her decision to remove land from the public domain, a deci-
sion with profound economic and environmental impacts. The 
inverse, returning land to the public domain , is not contem-
plated by the statutes and would involve a host of separate pol-
icy decisions not addressed by the statutory language guiding 
the original withdrawal. 
President Trump directed the Secretary of [nterior to 
review monument designations since 1996 with an eye for 
returning these lands to the public domain. 102 In the last twenty 
years, however, these lands have been integrated into a broader 
system ofland management. Disentangling a national monu-
ment from this system not only removes legal protections of 
that land, but also erodes legal and economic structures that 
have grown up in surrounding communities by virtue of a mon-
ument's unique status. It would also negate funds appropriated 
by Congress over the years to improve and maintain the land 
for public use. 103 In short, revocation entails an entirely differ-
ent cost-benefit analysis than the decision to withdraw land for 
the monument in the first place. This type of balancing is at the 
heart of Congress' legislative authority over public lands, and it 
can only delegate this authority with proper guidance. 
The decision to revoke a monument designation would 
also conflict with several statutes articulating broad policies 
for management of monuments and other protected areas . 
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Amendments to the ational Park Organic Act of 19 16 104 make 
c lear that national monuments are part of the at ional Park 
System, 105 and are fu lly covered by the general regulations 
protecting that System. 106 T he various units of thi s System are 
a "cumulati ve expres[sion] of a sing le national heritage." 107 
Furthem1ore: 
"[P] rotection, management, and admini strati on of the 
System units sha ll be conducted in light of the hig h 
public va lue and integri ty of the System and shall not be 
exerc ised in derogation of the values and purposes for 
which the System units have been established, except 
a directly and spec ifica lly provided by Congress." 108 
With the National Park Organic Act and subsequent 
amendments, Congress has imbued national monuments w ith 
purpose beyond the po li cy considerations guiding the Execu-
ti ve in withd rawing land under the Antiquiti es Act. Revoking a 
monument, and derogating these va lues , is a leg is lative act fo r 
Congress to take itse lf or to de legate w ith appropri ating guiding 
principles. 
Reading e ither the A ntiquiti es Act or OCSLA to grant the 
executive authori ty to reverse prev ious withdrawa ls would also 
ra ise consti tutional concerns under Nonde legation doctr ine. The 
Supreme Court 's Nondelegation doctrine prevents Congress 
from delegating its legislati ve authori ty to the executi ve branch 
without a lso prov iding an " inte lli gible principle" to guide its 
application. 109 The doctrine is rooted in separation of powers 
principles and intended to ensure Congress is making core pol-
icy choices as we ll as to fac ilitate judic ia l review of executi ve 
actions taken under de legated authority. 110 
Applied to the Antiquities Act and OCS LA, it is clear that 
the poli c ies guiding land withdrawa l would fa il to prov ide 
adequate guidance fo r the dec is ion to return the same land to 
the public domain. For instance, the Executi ve dete rmines that 
a publi c resource is of"hi storic sc ientifi c interest" to justify 
monument des ignation under the A ntiquiti es Act. 111 But can 
public land simply lose its hi stori ca l or sc ientifi c interest? The 
two statutes are light on guidance to begin with (indeed, th is is 
a va l id critic ism of the statutes and a reason for concern as the 
Executive identifies lands fo r w ithdrawa l) . A lack of guidance, 
however, should heighten concern about a dec ision to reverse 
a withdrawa l, a legislati ve one w ith lega l, economic, and envi-
ron menta l ramificat ions. 
D . R EVERS ING A L AND WITH DRAWAL D OES N OT 
EFFECTIVELY ABO LI SH AN ACT OF CONGRESS 
Because the power to reverse a land withd rawal 
through executi ve action is not inherent to the power to with-
draw land in the first place we would expect Congress to 
arti cul ate some po li cy principles to guide the dec is ion to re tu rn 
land to the public domain . This is notably di stinct fro m the 
approach taken by the only ex isting lega l authori ty on abo li sh-
ing a national monument under the Antiqui ties Act, conta ined 
in a 1938 Attorney General opinion.112 In the op ini on for Pres i-
dent Coolidge, the Attorney Genera l reasoned that the execu-
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tive action to w ithdraw land was in effect an act of Congress 
itse lf. 11 3 If one conceives of an executi ve order, or pres idential 
proc lamation as an act of Congress, then revoking that order 
or proclamation would effective ly abrogate an act of Congress, 
something the President obvious ly can not do.114 
In 1924, Pres ident Calvin Coo lidge procla imed Castle 
Pinckney National Monument fro m a U.S. fo rt that had ex isted 
in the Charl eston harbor s ince the earl y N ineteenth Century. 115 
Fourteen years later, Pres ident Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted to 
abo lish the monument and transfer the land to the contro l and 
j urisdi ction of the War Department. 11 6 Attorney Genera l Homer 
C ummings advised the President that he was without authority 
to issue the proposed proc lamation revoking the monument. 11 7 
The opinion borrowed heav ily fro m an earli er 1862 Atto rney 
Genera l opinion regarding the Pres ident 's power to return a 
milita ry reservati on to the publi c domain : 
A duty properl y perfo rmed by the Executi ve under 
statutory authority has the va lidi ty and sancti ty which 
be long to the statute itse lf, and, unless it be w ithin 
the terms of the power confe rred by that statu te, the 
Executi ve can no more destroy hi s own authori zed 
work, w ithout some other leg islati ve sanction, than any 
other person can. To assert such a principle is to cla im 
fo r the Executi ve the power to repea l or a lte r an act of 
Congress at will. 11 8 
The view that a land withd rawal made by the Pres ident 
under di screti on vested in her by statute was in effect a with -
drawa l by the Congress itse lf pervades several earlier Attorney 
Genera l opinions. 11 9 While I would reach the same outcome 
- requi ring an express or implied de legation by Cong ress to 
revoke - the opinions re ly on an outdated v iew of executi ve 
actions that w ill be updated ifa court reaches the issue. 
As noted above, executive actions taken pursuant to 
authority provided to the Pres ident by Congress are di stin-
gui shed fro m orders based on the Pres ident 's exc lus ive consti-
tutional authority. Both are di scretionary government fun ctions. 
Both can be legislati ve ly modi fied and nullifi ed. A nd both , 
when based upon legitimate constitutional authori ty o r statu-
tory grants of power to the pres ident, are eq uiva lent to laws. 120 
When an executi ve order conflicts w ith a statute, the statu te 
takes precedence. 12 1 The va lidi ty of an executi ve action, then, is 
w ith reference to the underl y ing authori ty, but is not a stand- in 
fo r that authori ty where the Executi ve ca rri es out a Congress io-
nal de legation. 
Yoo and Ganz iano are right tha t the 1938 Cummings O pin-
ion is on uneven factual and legal ground.122 The document 
is an outdated and unsatisfy ing guidepost fo r such a we ighty 
issue, and it is unclea r what influence the opinions w ill have on 
a rev iewing court today. 123 On the one hand , Attorney Genera l 
opinions are not binding on the Pres ident. 124 But statu tes are, 
and as with jurisprudence, Congress can incorporate a lega l 
interpretation of the Attorney General into a subseq uent legis la-
tive schemes and rat ify that interpreta tion. While a rev iew ing 
court today wi II like ly d isagree that Pres ident Trump is effec-
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tively revoking an Act of Congress by reversing withdrawals 
under the Antiquities Act and OCSLA, it should be persuaded 
that executive action over public lands must derive from legis-
lative authority. 
IV. THE ANTIQUITIES AcT AND Oc LA CANNOT BE 
READ TO DELEGATE REVOCATION AUTHORITY 
The President has no inherent authority to revoke a land 
withdrawal. The authority to withdraw land in the first place 
emanates from Congress ' Constitutional authority. 125 Whether a 
President may revoke a land withdrawal is properly understood 
as an executive action distinct from the original withdrawal 
itself. The lawfulness of that action depends on whether Con-
gress intended her to have that power. 126 
A rough division of authority between Congress and 
the President has grown around specific statutes and long-term 
understandings.127 Yoo and Ganziano argue that OCSLA and 
the Antiquities Act "do not even attempt to limit the president's 
power to reverse previous withdrawals ." 128 This approach 
relies on their argument that possession of the authority to grant 
implies the authority to revoke. This theory is not only incorrect 
as a matter of law but is misplaced where the authority arose 
from Congressional delegation. It is also wholly inconsistent 
with Congress' treatment of executive withdrawal authority in 
other statutory schemes. Congress has (a) repudiated implied 
executive authority in the public lands context, and (b) demon-
strated that it knows how to delegate revocation authority and 
has arguably ratified legal interpretations of limited executive 
authority under the Antiquities Act. 
A. CONGRESS HAS REPUDIATED IMPLIED EXECUTIVE 
WITHDRAWAL Aun-10R1rv. 
The Executive once exercised broad implied withdrawal 
authority, including an implied power to modify and revoke 
prior withdrawals. Beginning soon after the nation 's found-
ing, Presidents set aside land for numerous military bases and 
r ndian reservations on the assumption that no statutory del-
egation of authority was needed. 129 In several instances, this 
assumption supported an implied power to modify or revoke 
the prior withdrawal. 13° For example, Presidents commonly 
eliminated or reduced the size of lndian reservations that had 
been established through executive order.13 1 Eliminating and 
reducing Indian reservations was particularly controversial , 
since the withdrawal was not simply a protective action directed 
at the underlying land, but granted rights of occupancy and use 
to Indian communities. 132 The executive actions around reser-
vations and oilfields were also categorically different from the 
withdrawals contemplated by the Antiquities Act and OCSLA. 
They were extremely granular actions, reflecting a local pres-
ence of the Executive in managing conflict between the T ndian 
tribes and surrounding communities, as well as accommodating 
for development in the national interest, such as railroads and 
other public works. 
As national policy toward public lands shifted from dis-
position to reservation, Congress conceded broad managerial 
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authority to the executive in a series of statutes, including 
the Antiquities Act. 133 Congress' failure to repudiate earlier 
withdrawals also led the courts to infer acquiescence in some 
" implied nonstatutory authority . . . construed to fill all the 
interstices around express delegations." 134 A major Supreme 
Court case, United States v. Midwest Oil Co. , 135 upheld a with-
drawal by President Taft that directly contradicted a recent 
statute, reasoning that "scores and hundreds" of executive 
orders establishing or enlarging Indian and military reservations 
and oil reserves had established an allocation of power. 136 The 
case came to stand for the proposition that presidential author-
ity is stronger with respect to powers that Presidents applied 
expansively in a pattern of actions to which Congress has 
acquiesced. 137 Presidents continued to push the boundaries of 
delegated withdrawal authorities. 138 
Eventually, Congress reasserted control over withdrawals 
and reservations of public lands by limiting actions that could 
be taken by the executive branch. This included a policy of 
walking back executive authority to return withdrawn land to 
the public domain . For example, the ational Forest Manage-
ment Act provided that forest reserves could only be returned to 
the public domain by an act ofCongress. 139 Then in 1976, Con-
gress extinguished all non-statutory authority and most earlier 
statutory authority with the Federal Land Policy Management 
Act (FLPMA), replacing these authorities with new procedures 
for withdrawals. 14° FLPMA concluded an exhaustive review 
of federal land policy by the Public Land Law Review Com-
mission, which reported to Congress in 1970 with an overall 
message of reasserting public control over executive with-
drawal authority. 141 While earlier implied executive authorities 
are instructive, FLPMA's allocation of withdrawal authority 
between the Executive and Congress should control any present 
inquiry into the Antiquities Act and supplies a powerful back-
ground principle for interpreting OCSLA as well. 
FLPMA expressly repealed the Executive's implied del-
egation of withdrawal authority as well as twenty-nine statu-
tory provisions for executive withdrawal. 142 This acted on a 
principal recommendation by the review Commission that 
large-scale pern1anent or indefinite withdrawals should only be 
accomplished by an act of Congress.143 The Commission also 
recommended that smaller-scale withdrawal authority remain-
ing with the executive branch should be confined to specified 
purposes, governed by more specific procedures, open to public 
input, and generally of limited duration. 144 Despite these rec-
ommendations, Congress conspicuously left the Antiquities Act 
in place, with very limited discussion of why.145 Congress also 
expressly exempted the "Outer Continental Shelf' from the 
FLPMA definition of"public lands," leaving OCSLA in place 
as well. 146 
In light ofFLPMA, a court should be reluctant to find 
implied authority to revoke an executive action, particularly 
within statutory language that has withstood the review of leg-
islators with an eye for eliminating implied authorities. There 
is no practice of executive reversal of land withdrawals under 
the Antiquities Act and OCSLA, and courts upholding implied 
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executi ve authority were onl y w illing to do so in light of some 
practi ce in which Congress had acq uiesced. 
B. CONGRESS KNows HOW TO D ELEGATE R EVOCAT ION 
AurnoRJTY AND HAS P ASSED UP 0 PPORTU !TIES TO 
AM E D THE ANTIQUITI ES ACT AND OCSLA 
Congress knows how to delegate revocation authority 
when it wan ts to. Several turn-of-the-century statutes delegat-
ing withdrawa l power to the President specifica ll y included a 
provision a llowing the Pres ident or the Secretary of the Interior 
to revoke a prior withdrawal. The Forest Service Organic Act 
of 1897 authori zed the Pres ident to establish national forest 
reserves to "revoke, modify, or suspend" any past and future 
executive order or proclamation establishing a nationa l fo r-
est.147 Following a big fight about the controversial withdraw-
als of President C leveland under earli er forest acts, Congres 
amended the statute to "remove any doubt which may exist per-
taining to the authority of the Pres ident ... to revoke, modi fy 
or suspend." 148 The President's express authority to revoke, 
modi fy, and vacate certain orders and proclamations establish-
ing national forests remains today. 149 
Other examples of express revocation authority include 
Congress ' 190 I amendment to the Federal Desert Land Act 
to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to restore withdrawn 
lands to the public domain after a period oftime,150 and the 
19 10 Pickett Act, which gave the Pres ident authority to " tempo-
rarily" withdraw public lands but also provided that those with-
drawals were to " remain in force until revoked by him or an 
Act ofCongres ."151 It is clear from these examples that both in 
the years leading up to the Antiquities Act and after its passage, 
Congress considered the difference between one and two-way 
withdrawal schemes in various contexts. To read an implied 
authority to revoke into the Antiquities Act or OCSLA would 
render the express revocation clauses in other statutory authori-
ties as mere surplusage. 152 
FLPMA also created a process for the Secretary of the 
Interior to terminate severa l categories of prior executive with-
drawals. With FLPMA, Congress did not express ly modi fy, 
revoke or extend previous withdrawa ls153 but instead directed 
the Secretary of the Interior to review a substanti al number of 
withdrawals and report to the Pres ident recommendations con-
cerning their continuation .154 The Pres ident would then report 
hi s recommendations to Congre s, and the Secretary wou ld be 
permitted to terminate any executi ve withdrawals unless Con-
gre s objected by a concurrent reso lution within ninety days. 155 
As of 198 1, 233 withdrawal s covering about 20.4 million acres 
had been revoked under this process. 156 
To reiterate, FLPMA express ly provided that the Secretary 
sha ll not modify or revoke any withdrawal creating a national 
monument under the Antiquiti es Act. 157 The House Committee 
on Interior and Insular Affa irs report on the statute confirms it 
"would also spec ifica lly reserve to Congress the authori ty to 
modi fy and revoke withdrawa ls fo r national monuments created 
under the Antiquities Act." 158 This language is a clear signal 
that Congress was aware of the 1938 Attorney Genera l opin-
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ion arguing that leg is lators reta ined so le authority to revoke a 
monument under the Antiquities Act. 159 And when "Congress 
is deemed to know the executi ve and judicial g loss given to 
certa in language" a later statute comprehensively address ing 
the subject is persuasive that Congress has adopted the ex isting 
interpretation.160 The House Report a lso a ll eviated concerns 
that FLPMA only restricted the Secretary of the Interior's 
authority to revoke monuments, w hile remaining s il ent as to the 
President's authority. 161 
There have been numerous proposals to amend the Antiq-
uiti es Act over the last several decades, the most recent intro-
duced on May 2, 2017. 162 In rev iew ing these pro posa ls, I did 
not locate a s ing le attempt to express ly authorize the Pres ident 
to unil atera lly revoke a monument designation. If FLPMA did 
not confi rm otherwise, we might infer that Congress already 
assumes the Pres ident has thi s authority. lnstead, the bulk of the 
proposals have been to increase Congress' overs ig ht over the 
des ignation and management of national monuments. 163 
V. REVOCABILITY AND OUR ENVIRO'\'MENTAL 
POLICY OBJECTIVES 
The foregoing ana lysis demonstrates that, as a matter of 
law, the President cannot revoke a unil atera l land withdrawal 
under the Antiquities Act or OCSLA. This section raises norma-
ti ve arguments for reaching the same outcome, particularly in 
light of these statutes' utility in address ing contemporary envi-
ronmental policy objectives such as climate change adaptation 
and mitigation . 
Congress enacted the A ntiquities Act and OCSLA with 
very different purposes, and the ir Pres idential withdrawal 
authorit ies are different tool s in contemporary environmental 
policy. The Antiquities Act was mot ivated primaril y by concern 
for losing public land resources and hi stori cal arti facts before 
Congress could act. The withdrawal authority was central to 
thi s purpose. OCSLA was a much broader legis lati ve scheme, 
providing for federal jurisdiction of the outer continenta l shelf 
and authori zing the Secretary of Inte ri or to lease those lands for 
minera l development. The withdrawal provi sion carri es nearly 
identica l lega l effect to its analogous provis ion in the A ntiqui-
ties Act, though it is often obscured by the broader purposes of 
OCSLA. 
The Pres ident may not proclaim a national monument 
under the Antiquities Act with the ex press purpose of address-
ing climate change, fo r instance. However, protecting areas 
deemed to have " histori c or scientifi c" 164 intere t under the 
Act can nonethe less have economic and environmenta l ben-
efits consistent w ith our climate change goals. Proc la iming a 
national monument brings natura l areas under the purview of 
an agency, genera ll y the ational Park Serv ice, Forest Ser-
vice, or Fish and Wildli fe Service, with ex perti se in lo ng-term 
conservation of natura l resources and unique ecologies. These 
protected areas serve as carbon s inks and havens for biological 
diversity. Most importantly, the effect of mo nument status is 
a lso to freeze minera l extraction and other development there, 
keeping fossil resources in the ground . 
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Studies show that the old vulnerability of antiquities loot-
ing has given way to the new vulnerability of climate change 
for many of our country's most iconic and historic sites. A 
report by the Union of Concerned Scientists chronicles how 
many of these sites are particularly at risk from rising sea lev-
els, more frequent wildfires, increased flooding, and other dam-
aging effects of climate change. 165 The Antiquities Act would 
not seem to permit land withdrawal for the sake of creating a 
carbon sink to keep fossil fuels in the ground. However, once 
an area is deemed to have "historic or scientific interest" under 
the Act, the damaging effects of climate change should be a 
consideration in taking protective measures. 
As previously discussed, OCSLA permits the President 
to withdraw areas of the outer continental shelf from mineral 
leasing for any purpose. 166 President Obama's Executive Order 
on the North Bering Sea relied on OCSLA to create a "climate 
resilience area." 167 The corresponding withdrawal of outer con-
tinental shelflands "furthere[ d] the principles of responsible 
public stewardship entrusted to [the White House] and ... the 
importance of the withdrawn area to Alaska Native tribes, wild-
life, and wildlife habitat, and the need for regional resiliency in 
the face of climate change." 168 
The controversy surrounding withdrawals under both stat-
utes is understandable and extends much deeper than disagree-
ment over how, if at all, to let our concern for climate change 
drive our decisions around resource extraction and natural 
area preservation. Outcry over President Obama 's withdrawals 
and President Trump's reaction reflect both real political dis-
agreement over federal land management priorities, as well as 
valid concern for the reach of executive authority over public 
lands. Unilateral executive authority to reverse these actions is 
improper regardless of the claim and would only seem to fur-
ther aggrandize the President's public lands authority. 
One observation is that a one-way authority to protect 
lands, but not to undo these protections, plays to the Execu-
tive 's advantages while avoiding its faults. With the Antiquities 
Act, Congress recognized that the Executive could act more 
nimbly to identify and protect valuable resources. If it disagreed 
with a proclamation, Congress remained free to undo or modify 
the President's action, albeit subject to a possible presidential 
veto. 169 Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, with a 
boundary currently in legal limbo, is a good example. President 
Clinton withdrew the lands after legislative proposals for vary-
ing degrees of legal protection cleared House and Senate com-
mittees but ultimately failed. 170 Deliberative approaches to our 
public resources are preferable, but there is a fine line between 
productive deliberation and political gridlock. Gridlock might 
prevent us from taking any protection action at all , with irre-
versible consequences for natural and cultural resources. 
We should be less concerned about gridlock in the reverse, 
to return lands to the public domain. Congress's failure to take 
protective action might be explained by the diffusion of pro-
environment interests. By comparison, industry interests advo-
cating for development and resource extraction of public lands 
are relatively concentrated. This dynamic supports a one-way 
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executive authority to protect, overcoming gridlock to preserve 
the status quo and putting the onus on concentrated interests 
to make the case for development. Moving remedial legisla-
tion through both chambers can be a struggle 171 and ultimately 
requires the President 's signature, but Congress has success-
fully reversed monuments and other withdrawals in the past. 
It is also important to note that President Obama's use 
of the Antiquities Act and OCSLA was much more delibera-
tive than critics would suggest. The designation of Bears Ears 
National Monument is a good example. The monument was 
first discussed in the 1930s as part of an unsuccessful pro-
posal to establish an Escalante National Monument. 172 Several 
years ago, an Inter-Tribal Coalition unsuccessfully petitioned 
Utah 's Congressional representatives. 173 The tribes then suc-
cessfully petitioned President Obama, whose administration 
undertook extensive study and community engagement before 
making proclaiming the monument almost two years later. 174 
The process exhibits some of the unique tools at the Execu-
tive's disposal in making withdrawal decisions, including field 
offices and experienced agency staff throughout the West. The 
Executive branch is also arguably better suited than Congress to 
integrate the policy considerations around withdrawal into the 
broader scheme of public lands authorities the agencies imple-
ment. 
Singing the praises of executive withdrawal authority 
- exercising agency expertise, grassroots community engage-
ment, and others - might undercut arguments that executive 
reversa l of land withdrawals would be too drastic. Presumably, 
the reversal of a predecessor 's monuments or outer continental 
shelf withdrawals would reflect patience, sound science and a 
balancing of stakeholder interests. Unfortunately, President's 
Trump's proclamations and the underlying review of monument 
designations by the Interior Department have none of these 
qualities. They are starkly political and evidence a concerning 
preoccupation with development our fossil fuel resources at a 
time when most economic and environmental assessments sug-
gest leaving them in the ground. 
A final justification for a one-way executive withdrawal 
authority, then , is that we cannot afford to play politics with our 
public resources. The benefits of protective measures under the 
Antiquities Act and OCSLA come in their stability, particularly 
with respect to climate change. National monuments are shown 
to have significant economic benefits over time, and these ben-
efits can far outweigh the extractive value of the resources they 
hold .175 However, it takes time for surrounding communities 
to invest in an economy of conservation, just as environmental 
benefits such as preserving biodivers ity or a carbon sink, or 
the scientific research these resources enable, are measured not 
in years but lifetimes. It is in recognition of these long-term 
benefits that monuments have staying power and are frequently 
expanded and enhanced by Congress rather than reversed . 
We will never take full advantage of what Antiquities Act or 
OCSLA withdrawals have to offer if each Presidential election 
brings with it the specter ofreversal for these unique places and 
the communities they support. 
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VI. CO'\C'LLSIO\ 
The ongo ing debate over executi ve land withdrawal 
authori ty implicates legal and practical considerations of 
great importance. As thi s paper has argued, Pres ident Trump 's 
unprecedented steps to reverse the protecti ve measures of hi s 
predecessors - not only President Obama but Pres idents Bush, 
Clinton, and potenti a ll y others - have overstepped his ex isting 
lega l authority. Congress could amend the Antiquities Act or 
OCS LA to express ly permit executive reversa l, but this would 
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